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Using a controlled experiment, we examine the role of nurture in explaining the stylized fact that
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Women have been catching up to men in the workplace since the 1980s. The gender
wage gap has not disappeared, though. Women still lag behind men in average pay and with
regard to opportunities for advancement.1 Commonly cited reasons for these di⁄erences are
discrimination or claims that women, more than men, are sensitive to work-family con￿ icts
and more inclined to make career sacri￿ces.2 However, obtaining promotion and pay raises
often involves competition, and it may be that women do not like to compete. If women
dislike competition but men enjoy it, there will be two e⁄ects. First, fewer women will
choose to enter a competitive environment, and second there will be fewer women succeeding
in competitions. Recent experimental evidence has found that, when given the choice of
whether or not to enter tournaments, women ￿ shy away from competition￿while men may
choose to compete too much (e.g. Datta Gupta, Poulsen, and Villeval (2005); Niederle and
Vesterlund (2007)).3 Understanding why women seem less inclined than men to compete
can provide insight into why a gender gap still exists in the workplace and what type of
policies might address this gap.
Innate di⁄erences are one obvious factor that might explain the gender competition-
gap.4 While nature might well be important in shaping competitive behaviour, the culture
or environment in which an individual is raised might reduce or exacerbate gender disparities.
For example, even if boys are more athletic than girls, hearing boys taunt one another with
claims of ￿ throwing like a girl￿may discourage athletically talented girls from participating in
sports that involve throwing, increasing the performance gap that existed because of innate
di⁄erences. Likewise, if girls are naturally more talented with the written word, requiring
boys to read and prepare book reports may dampen any gap that existed. Psychologists
have shown that framing of tasks and cultural stereotypes do a⁄ect the performance of
individuals.5 Therefore, even if innate di⁄erences do exist with regard to competition, the
environment may still be a major factor contributing to observed di⁄erences. The role of
nurture ￿environment, culture or upbringing ￿may therefore be central to explaining why
1.A study by Bertrand and Hallock (2001) found that women in top corporate jobs earn about 5%
less than their male counterparts and only represented 2.5% of high-level executives of large US ￿rms from
1992-1997.
2.See for example Albrecht, Bjorklund and Vroman (2003), Blau and Kahn (2004), and Arulampalam,
Booth and Bryan (2007).
3.Croson and Gneezy (2008) summarize the experimental literature on gender di⁄erences in risk, compe-
tition and social preferences. Eckel and Grossman (2002) provide a summary of gender di⁄erences an even
broader range of experimental literature and Eckel and Grossman (2008) focuses on the risk and gender.
4.Refer to Lawrence (2006) or Summers (2005) for discussions of the role innate di⁄erences may play.
Barres (2006), on the other hand, aims to explain what is wrong with the nature hypothesis.
5.See Steele, Spencer, and Aronson (2002) for a summary of the stereotype threat literature and the role
of stereotype threat in performance.
1men and women di⁄er in their choices of whether or not to enter tournaments.6
Establishing whether or not nurture plays a role in tournament entry is important in
shaping the policy debate around gender di⁄erences in educational and labour market out-
comes. First, it provides guidance as to whether or not gender di⁄erences in outcomes
should be of concern. If nature is the primary reason for gender di⁄erences in tournament
entry, then existing gender pay gaps may simply re￿ ect economically important di⁄erences in
preferences rather than underlying prejudice or discrimination in the workplace. However,
if nurture is found to modify preferences for tournament entry, then we need to learn more
about the various environmental factors shaping such preferences. Second, examining the
role of nature provides insight into what policies might be implemented to address gender
di⁄erences in outcomes. If nature is the primary reason for di⁄erences, a policy-maker aim-
ing to decrease the gender gap may need to change the manner in which work is rewarded.
However, if nurture is a primary reason, policies or curricula could be designed to address
cultural or environmental factors a⁄ecting girls before they enter the workplace.
In this paper we examine the role that nurture might play in explaining the stylized
fact that women shy away from competion. We do this by studying the choices made by
girls from single-sex and coeducational schools when they are given the opportunity to enter
a tournament in a controlled experiment. While we use a di⁄erent subject pool to that
utilised in the literature, we follow a similar methodology by observing subjects￿behaviour
in response to di⁄erent compensation schemes. But we also augment that approach in several
crucial respects, as will be described below.
Why might single-sex schooling favour competitiveness in general? It is often argued that
girls bene￿t academically from single-sex education, in part by achieving higher scores on
standardized exams.7 Moreover, educational studies show that there may be more pressure
for girls to maintain their gender identity in schools where boys are present than for boys
when girls are present (Maccoby, 1990; Brutsaert, 1999). In a coeducational environment,
adolescent girls are more explicitly confronted with adolescent subculture (such as personal
attractiveness to members of the opposite sex) than they are in a single-sex environment
(Coleman, 1961). This may lead them to conform to boys￿expectations of how girls should
6.Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003), using a subject pool of coed engineering students, ￿nd a
signi￿cant gender gap in performance when compensation is tournament-based but not when it is piece-
rate. This di⁄erence across groups might be due to stereotype threats (Steele, 1997), since being in a mixed
group heightens subjects￿awareness of gender and prompts them to behave in accordance with their gender
stereotype. That subjects￿behaviour alters in response to such prompts also suggests that environment
matters - even an environment in which the subjects have been placed for such a short time. One goal of
the present paper is to see if environments in which individuals have been placed for far longer - typically
4-5 years - counteracts this.
7.See Campbell and Sanders (2002) for an overview of the empirical studies on single-sex education and
its e⁄ect on girls.
2behave to avoid social rejection (American Association of University Women, 1992 ). If
behaving competitively is viewed as being a part of male gender identity but not of female,
then being in a coeducational school environment might lead girls to make less competitive
choices than boys.
How might this actually work? It is helpful to extend the identity approach of Akerlof
and Kranton (2000) to this context. Adolescent girls in a coed environment could be subject
to more con￿ ict in their gender identity, since they have to compete with boys academically
while at the same time they may feel pressured to develop their femininity in order to be
attractive to boys at school. Moreover, there may be an externality at work, since girls
are competing with other girls to be popular with boys. This externality may reinforce
their need to adhere to their female gender identity. Why would boys not feel similarly
pressured? First, academic success, assertive behaviour and being attractive to girls are
not such contradictory goals, owing to the prevalence of the male bread-winner model in
our society. While adolescent boys in a coed environment are also likely to be very aware
of their gender identity, they may experience di⁄erent con￿ icts to those of the girls. To
the extent that the presence of girls pressures boys to develop their masculinity to increase
their popularity ￿or to reduce any threat to their male identity - this might make them
more assertive and competitive. The fact that they are also competing with other boys for
popularity might reinforce this tendency.
If this is true, we would expect girls in coed schools to be less likely than girls in single-sex
schools to enter tournaments. We might also expect coed schoolboys to be more competitive
than single-sex schoolboys, although the education literature suggests that there is greater
pressure for girls to maintain their gender identity in schools where boys are present than
for boys when girls are present (Maccoby, 1990, 1998). Indeed the coed environment could
socialize boys, since the presence of girls could make them more aware that macho activities
do not necessarily improve their popularity with the opposite sex.
In a recent experimental contribution also addressing the role of nurture, Gneezy,
Leonard and List (2008) compare subjects from a matrilineal and a patriarchal society.
They ￿nd that women from the matrilineal society choose to compete as much as men from
the patriarchal society.8 We too use a controlled experiment to see if there are gender dif-
ferences in the behaviour of subjects from two distinct environments or ￿ cultures￿ . But our
environments - publicly-funded single-sex and coeducational schools - are closer to one an-
8.Gneezy et al. investigated two distinct societies - the Maasai tribe of Tanzania and the Khasi tribe
in India. The former are patriarchal while the latter are matrilineal. In the patriarchal society, women are
less competitive than men, a result that is consistent with the ￿ndings of studies using data from Western
cultures. But in the matrilineal society, women are more competitive. Indeed, the Khasi women were as
competitive as Maasai men.
3other than those in Gneezy et al (2008) and it seems unlikely that there is much evolutionary
distance between our subjects. Any observed gender di⁄erences in behaviour across these
two distinct environments is more likely to be due to the nurturing received from parents,
teachers or peers than to nature. Given this, we expect that girls from single-sex schools
will chose to compete more than girls from coed schools.
The rest of this paper is in ￿ve parts. In Section II we discuss the four conjectures
we will test and how they can shed light on the nature and nurture debate with regard to
competition. In Section III we describe the pool from which our sample was drawn and the
design of the experiment. The results are discussed in Sections IV and V, while Section VI
concludes.
II. Conjectures
While the subject pool in our experiment di⁄ers in age and educational background
from those used in previous studies, we nonetheless hypothesise that we too will ￿nd gender
di⁄erences in tournament entry. This is summarised in the ￿rst conjecture.
Conjecture 1. Men choose to enter the tournament more than women.
If it is the case that men, on average, prefer to compete more than women, then our
experimental data will support this conjecture. However, while any such evidence would
show that the gender gap in tournament entry is robust to a change in subject pool, it
would not identify if the gender gap is due to nature or nurture. Preference di⁄erences for
competition could arise from innate di⁄erences between men and women or in how how they
are raised. If evidence supporting Conjecture 1 is due primarily to nature, we would expect
to ￿nd that gender di⁄erences in tournament entry are not sensitive to a subject￿ s schooling
or to the gender make-up of the experimental peer-group to which one was assigned. But
if nurture plays a role, we would expect to ￿nd that tournament entry varies across our
categories of interest. This leads us to our next three conjectures.
Conjecture 2. Girls from single-sex schools choose to enter the tournament more than
girls from coed schools.
This conjecture suggests that same-sex schooling can modify, in an economically impor-
tant way, female preferences for making competitive choices. If we ￿nd evidence that girls
from single-sex schools choose to enter the tournament more than girls from coed schools, this
could suggest that nurture can a⁄ect a girl￿ s choice. Given that subjects are not randomly
4assigned to their school, we will also control for factors that could potentially be correlated
with attendance, as will be explained later.
Suppose we ￿nd that, conditional on observable factors, girls from single-sex schools
choose to enter the tournament more than girls from coed schools. This would provide more
support for the case that nurture plays a role than if the controls explained all the di⁄erence
in tournament entry decisions.
Conjecture 3. Girls in single-sex experimental peer-groups choose to enter the tourna-
ment more than girls in coed experimental peer-groups.
Psychologists have shown that cultural stereotypes and the framing of tasks a⁄ect the
performance of individuals (see inter alia Steele, Spencer, and Aronson, 2002). Being in a
single-sex group for the experiment might trigger subjects in particular ways that relate to
their gender identity. For example, schoolgirls assigned to mixed-sex groups may feel their
gender identity is threatened when they are confronted with boys. This might encourage
them to a¢ rm their femininity by conforming to perceived male expectations of girls￿be-
haviour, leading them to be less competitive if they perceive this as being a feminine trait.
Should the same girl be assigned instead to an all-girl group, such reactions would not be
triggered.9 In short, the cue of the gender composition of the experimental group is likely
to a⁄ect female behaviour. This hypothesis is summarised in Conjecture 3, which suggests
that assignment to a same-sex group can modify, in an economically important way, female
preferences for making competitive choices.
To test this, we randomly assign students to single-sex or coed groups in the experiment.
This allows us to examine how the gender composition of a group a⁄ects the choice of girls to
enter a tournament. Since subjects are randomly assigned to groups, unobservables should
not be driving the e⁄ects.
Two other studies have looked at competition and the e⁄ect of the gender make-up of the
experimental peer-group. However they looked at the e⁄ect on tournament performance and
not the choice to enter a tournament. Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini (2003) found that
girls performed better in tournaments when boys were not present but Gneezy and Rustichini
(2004) found no improvement when subjects were in single-sex groups. We expect that girls
in an all-girls group will choose to enter the tournament more than girls in a mixed gender
group.
Next we consider how girls will behave relative to boys.
9.If girls do feel more pressured to maintain their gender identity when boys are present than boys feel
when girls are present, then we should expect to observe a gender gap in competitive behaviour for girls and
boys attending single-sex schools who are assigned to mixed-sex groups. We discuss this in a later section.
5Conjecture 4. Girls from single-sex schools choose to enter the tournament at the same
rate as boys.
As noted in the Introduction, studies show that there may be more pressure for girls to
maintain their gender identity in schools where boys are present than for boys when girls
are present. If behaving competitively is viewed as a part of male gender identity but not of
female, then being educated in a coeducational school environment might lead girls to make
less competitive choices than boys.
In our analysis we will control for other variables proxying socialization and possible se-
lection, namely parental education and family background including the number and gender
of the subject￿ s siblings. Since the type of school a student attends is not randomly assigned
within our experiment, we will also compare single-sex students to di⁄erent control groups
and use two econometric techniques - an instrumental variable approach and propensity score
matching - to check the robustness of our results. Furthermore, the fact that our experiment
randomly assigns students to single-sex and coed groups will allow us to estimate an e⁄ect
of single-sex peer groups on girls that is not a⁄ected by unobservables.
III. Experimental Design
Our experiment was designed to test the four conjectures listed above. To examine
the role of nurturing, we recruited students from coeducational and single-sex schools to be
subjects. We also designed an ￿ exit￿survey to elicit information about family background
characteristics. At no stage were the schools we selected, or the subjects who volunteered,
told why they were chosen. Our subject pool is relatively large for a controlled, laboratory-
type experiment. We wished to have a large number of subjects from a variety of educational
backgrounds in order to be able to investigate the conjectures outlined above.
Below we ￿rst discuss the educational environment from which our subjects were drawn,
and then the experiment itself.
III.A. Subjects and Educational Environment
In September 2007, students from eight publicly-funded schools in the counties of Essex
and Su⁄olk in the UK were bused to the Colchester campus of the University of Essex to
participate in the experiment. Four of the schools were single-sex.10 The students were
10.A pilot was conducted several months earlier, in June at the end of the previous school year. The
point of the pilot was to determine the appropriate level of di¢ culty and duration of the actual experiment.
6from years 10 or 11, and their average age was just under 15 years. On arrival, students
from each school were randomly assigned into 65 groups of four. Groups were of three
types: all-girls; all-boys; or mixed. Mixed groups had at least one student of each gender
and the modal group comprised two boys and two girls. The composition of each group - the
appropriate mix of single-sex schools, coeducational schools and gender - was determined
beforehand. Thus only the assignment of the 260 girls and boys from a particular school
to a group was random. The school mix was two coeducational schools from Su⁄olk (103
students), two coeducational schools from Essex (45 students), two all-girl schools from Essex
(66 students), and two all-boy schools from Essex (46 students).
In Su⁄olk county there are no single-sex publicly-funded schools. In Essex county the
old ￿grammar￿ schools remain, owing to a quirk of political history.11 These grammar
schools are single-sex and, like the coeducational schools, are publicly funded. It is highly
unlikely that students themselves actively choose to go to the single-sex schools. Instead
Essex primary-school teachers, with parental consent, choose the more able children to sit
for the Essex-wide exam for entry into grammar schools.12 Parents must be resident in
Essex for their children to be eligible to sit the entrance exam (the 11+ exam). It is possible
that more informed or more competitive Essex parents may persuade their children to sit
for the 11+ and indeed may coach their children for the 11+. Sitting for the 11+ is more
likely to re￿ ect the ambition or pushiness of the parents and teachers rather than that of the
children. Therefore students at the single-sex schools are not a random subset of the students
in Essex, since they are selected based on measurable ability at age 11 as well as ￿parental
pushiness￿ .13 Our controls for parental education - obtained from the exit questionnaire -
may pick up unobservable ￿parental pushiness￿ , which is part of the nurturing environment.
The pilot used a di⁄erent subject pool to that used in the real experiment. It comprised students from
two schools (one single-sex in Essex and one coeducational in Su⁄olk) who had recently completed year 11.
The actual experiment conducted some months later, at the start of the new school year, used, as subjects,
students who had just started years 10 or 11.
11.In the UK, schools are controlled by local area authorities but frequently ￿directed￿by central gov-
ernment. Following the 1944 Education Act, grammar schools became part of the central government￿ s
tripatrtite system of grammar, secondary modern and technical schools (the latter never got o⁄the ground).
By the mid-1960s, the central Labour government put pressure on local authorities to establish ￿comprehen-
sive￿schools in their place. Across England and Wales, grammar schools survived in some areas (typically
those with long-standing Conservative boroughs) but were abolished in most others. In some counties the
grammar schools left the state system altogether and became independent schools; these are not part of our
study. However, in parts of Essex, single-sex grammar schools survive as publicly-funded entities, while in
Su⁄olk they no longer exist.
12.If a student achieves a high enough score on the exam, s/he can attend one of the 12 schools in
the Consortium of Selective Schools in Essex (CSSE). The vast majority of these are single-sex. The four
single-sex schools in our experiment are part of the CSSE.
13.Examples of parental unobservables likely to determine whether or not children are encouraged to sit
for the 11+ include parental ambition, parental heterogeneity in discount rates, social custom factors, or
lack of information about potential bene￿ts of education.
7We also control for ability in our analysis, as will be described below. Moreover, we asked
our participating coeducational schools from both Essex and Su⁄olk to provide students
only from the higher-ability academic stream so that they would be more comparable to the
grammar school students.14 There are no grammar schools in Su⁄olk. We will perform a
series of robustness checks to control for possible di⁄erences between students from co-ed
and single-sex schools after we examine di⁄erent choices made by students.15
The experiment took place in a very large auditorium with 1,000 seats arranged in tiers.
Students in the same group were seated in the same row with an empty seat between each
person. There was also an empty row in front of and behind each group. While subjects
were told which other students were in the same group, they were sitting far enough apart
for their work to be private information. If two students from the same school were assigned
to a group, they were forced to sit as far apart as possible; for example, in a group of four,
two other students would sit between the students from the same school. There was one
supervisor, a graduate student, assigned to supervise every ￿ve groups. Once the experiment
began, students were told not to talk. Each supervisor enforced this rule and also answered
individual questions. Consequently, during the experiment there was very little talking
within or between groups.
III.B. Experiment
At the start of the experiment, students were told that they would be performing a
number of tasks, and that one of these would be randomly chosen for payment at the end of
the experiment.16 In each round students had 5 minutes to solve as many of 15 mazes as
possible. The instructions are given in the Appendix.17 Before the ￿rst task was explained,
students were shown a practice maze, given instructions on how to solve it, and allowed
14.To compare students of roughly the same ability we recruited students from the top part of the
distribution in the two coeducational schools in Essex: only students in the academic streams were asked to
participate. Students from Su⁄olk do not have the option to take the 11+ exam and therefore higher ability
students are unlikely to be selected out of Su⁄olk schools in the same way as in Essex. Nonetheless we only
recruited students from the academic streams in the Su⁄olk as well.
15.The 11+ exam scores of students are unfortunately not available from the CSSE, the body that ad-
ministers the 11+ exam. Therefore regression discontinuity analysis is not a feasible option for us..
16.Payment was randomized in the same manner as in Datta Gupta, Poulsen, and Villeval (2005) and
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007). Since the round students are paid for is randomly selected at the end of the
experiment, they should maximize their payo⁄ in each round in order to maximize their payment overall.
Moreover, as only one round was selected for payment, students did not have the opportunity to hedge across
tasks.
17.Mazes were of the type that can be found at http://games.yahoo.com/games/maze.html. These
mazes have been used in several economic experiments before: Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini (2003);
Datta Gupta, Poulsen, and Villeval (2005); and Ho⁄ and Pandey (2004). For this experiment the di¢ culty
used was the easiest of the ￿Easy to Hard￿scale found at the bottom right hand side on the webpage.
8to ask any questions. Immediately before each round, students were told the nature of
the task to be carried out and the payment for that round. At this stage, students were
permitted to ask questions of clari￿cation about that round. At no stage were students told
how they performed relative to others in their group. The speci￿c payment mechanisms are
explained below, in the order in which the rounds occurred. No student was able to solve
all 15 mazes in the time allotted. All mazes were double-blind marked as is the standard in
UK universities.
The three rounds of the experiment closely follow those of Niederle and Vesterland (2007).
We wished to use a well-tested experimental strategy to investigate a new conjecture - that
nurturing, in either single-sex or coeducational environments, may a⁄ect women￿ s propensity
to compete. In contrast, Niederle and Vesterland (2007) used the coeducational subject pool
of the Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Laboratory at the University of Pittsburgh. Their
tasks involved the addition of numbers whereas ours involve completing paper mazes.
The incentive structure of each round is laid out below. We also conducted an exit
questionnaire at the end of the experiment.
Round 1: Piece Rate. Students were asked to solve as many mazes as possible in 5
minutes. They would receive £0.50 for each maze solved correctly if this round was
randomly selected for payment.
Round 2: Tournament. Students were asked to solve as many mazes as possible in 5
minutes. If this round was randomly selected for payment, the group-winner would
receive £2 for each maze solved correctly and the other members zero.
Round 3: Choice of Tournament or Piece Rate. Students were asked to choose either
Option One or Option Two and then solve as many mazes as possible in 5 minutes.
Payment would depend on which option they chose if this round was randomly selected
for payment. If a student were to choose Option One, she would get £0.50 per maze
solved correctly. If she chose Option Two, she would get £2 per maze solved correctly
IF she solved more mazes correctly than anyone else in her group did the previous
round and zero otherwise.
Exit Questionnaire. At the end, students were asked to complete an exit questionnaire.
This questionnaire asked about family background, parents, any siblings, residential
postcode and risk-attitudes.
The payments (both the show-up fee of £5 plus any payment from performance in the
randomly selected round) were in cash and were hand-delivered in sealed envelopes (clearly
9labelled with each student￿ s name) to the schools a few days after the experiment. The
average payment was £7. In addition, immediately after completing the Exit Questionnaire,
each student was given a bag containing a soft drink, packet of crisps and bar of chocolate.
IV. Piece-Rate and Mandatory Tournament
When examining the choice of whether to enter the tournament we want to be able to
control for ability, learning and any family or background di⁄erences that could be driving
the results. Therefore we examine the summary statistics by school-type and experimental
peer-groups for both boys and girls and we check if, within school-type, girls and boys look
the same. Table 1 shows school-type di⁄erences for boys and girls.
[Table 1 - Summary Statistics by school-type for boys and girls]
The parents of students at single-sex schools are more likely to have gone to univer-
sity, suggesting ￿parental pushiness￿may be at play, to the extent that educated parents
may be more likely to push their children into grammar schools. (Alternatively, better edu-
cated parents might give their children a head-start in skills acquisition, facilitating better
performance in the 11+.) Moveover, an educated parent could a⁄ect a daughter or son￿ s
propensity to compete. For example, educated parents might be more competitive, or enjoy
competition more, and encourage their children to compete in more events or tasks than
would parents without a university degree. The gender make-up of siblings may also a⁄ect
an individual￿ s competitiveness. If males are more competitive than females, having more
brothers may cause a girl to feel more at home in a competitive environment. Girls at
single-sex schools have fewer sisters than girls at coeducational schools but no fewer siblings
in general. However boys at single-sex schools have slightly fewer siblings. When looking
at boys and girls in the same type of school setting, as in Table 2, there are fewer di⁄erences:
in single-sex schools girls are, on average, older than boys; in coed schools boys are more
likely to have had their father attend university.
[Table 2 - Summary Statistics by gender for coed and single-sex schools]
Since we are aiming to compare girls from single-sex and coeducational schools who are
roughly the same, and we are going to want to compare the gender gap within coed and
single-sex schools we need to control for these observed di⁄erences. Therefore in all of
our regressions we will control for age, parental education, the number of siblings, and the
number of female siblings. Furthermore, we will allow these e⁄ects to vary by gender and
10school-type so we will interact the controls by gender and schooling in all regressions. With
regards to experimental peer-group we provide a summary in Table 3 below.
[Table 3 - Summary Statistics by group type for boys and girls]
The ￿rst two rounds of our experiment are primarily going to be used to control for
ability. Despite this it is interesting to estimate their determinants. The ￿rst three columns
in Table 4 show the OLS regressions for the piece-rate round. On average, students solved
2.59 mazes correctly. Column [1] shows that a gender gap exists; women solve roughly
two-thirds of a maze less than boys. The coe¢ cient on female gets slightly larger when
we add in controls for parental background, the age of the student and siblings, and allow
those e⁄ects to vary by gender and school-type, as shown in column [2] ￿girls still solve
fewer mazes than boys. Column [3] allows comparisons of students from single-sex and coed
schools and students in all-girl, all-boy and mixed gender groups. Even when controlling
for educational background and group composition the gender gap for performance in the
piece-rate setting still exists; girls solve 0.91 mazes less than boys.
[Table 4 ￿Basic Regressions]
The next round of the experiment was the mandatory tournament. The information from
this round will also be used in our subsequent analysis. The change in performance following
a shift from piece-rate to tournament might be a⁄ected by a number of factors, including
ability, learning, and competition. The larger payment given to the winner has two e⁄ects.
First, it gives students an incentive to work harder because they get four times as much for
each maze they solve correctly if they win. Second, students are also motivated to work
harder because if they lose they get nothing. The last three columns of Table 2 show how a
student changed behavior in the tournament compared with the piece-rate setting. Columns
[4]-[6] present the regression results for a student￿ s tournament score (the number of mazes
solved in the second round) minus her/his piece-rate score (the number of mazes solved in
the ￿rst round).
After controlling for background and performance in the piece-rate setting, girls increased
their performance as much as boys in the tournament setting; the gender gap in columns [5]
and [6] is not statistically signi￿cant. The sign on the female coe¢ cient is consistent with
Gneezy et. al. (2003), suggesting that the results from the ￿rst two rounds are comparable
with what has been found in the previous experimental work on gender and competition.
The signi￿cant coe¢ cient that is robust to each setting is the score in the piece-rate set-
ting. Subjects scoring high in the ￿rst round did not improve their score as much in the
11tournament. Since no student solved all mazes correctly, this suggests that some students
are adequately motivated by the piece-rate setting.
The results of these ￿rst two rounds ￿the tournament score and the increase in perfor-
mance from the piece-rate to tournament setting ￿will be used to control for ability and
learning when examining a student￿ s choice about whether or not to enter a tournament
in Round 3. However Round 2 is important for another reason: it provides students with
information about how they perform in a tournament setting. Therefore, when choosing to
compete in Round 3, the student knows her ability, how she performs under pressure, and
has had experience in the competitive environment. Hence she should be able to make an
informed decision on whether or not to enter the tournament.
V. Choosing To Compete
In this section we will discuss the decision of whether or not to enter a tournament and
the probability of winning, and will relate choices to the four conjectures set out in Section
II. We will see if girls from coed and single-sex schools di⁄er in their propensity to chose
competition, and will then compare girls to boys from coed and single-sex schools (our goal
here is to see if a single-sex girl makes di⁄erent choices to those made by boys of the same
ability).
V.A. The Probability of Winning Round 2
As shown in Table 1, the average number of mazes solved by single-sex schoolgirls in
the piece-rate round was 2.62 while for coed schoolgirls it was 2.16 and this di⁄erence is
statistically signi￿cant. The scores for the mandatory tournament (Round 2) were 4.14
and 3.78 for single-sex and coed schoolgirls respectively and the di⁄erence is not statistically
signi￿cant. Furthermore, Table 2 shows that these scores are lower for girls than boys in both
types of school settings. Because of these gender di⁄erences in the probability of winning,
one might expect girls and boys to make di⁄erent competitive choices. Moreover, the
probability of winning will di⁄er depending on the group to which the student was assigned.
In this subsection we therefore consider what level of competition might be optimal for the
individual. Of course subjects do not know how they compare with others in their group
because they are never told this. But they will have beliefs about this, beliefs that are likely
to be shaped by their performance in the piece-rate and mandatory tournament rounds as
well as by their backgrounds. Hence it is important to control for background factors and
for previous performance when estimating the tournament choice in Round 3 - which we do
12below.
To assess the probability of winning Round 2, we randomly created four-person groups
from the observed performance distribution for Round 2. Conditioning on gender and group
(same-gender or mixed), the win probability is 25% for girls and boys assigned to same-
gender groups but in mixed groups it is 36% for boys and 14% for girls.18 Therefore, if girls
and boys know the performance distribution of the mandatory tournament (and they do
not), they should choose to enter the tournament in Round 3 at the same rate if they are
in same-gender groups. However in mixed groups boys should choose the tournament more
than girls.
Now consider the win probability conditional on performance in the mandatory tourna-
ment. For boys solving 5 mazes in same-gender groups, the probability of winning is 12%
while for girls it is 43%. For those who solved 6 mazes, it increases to 47% for boys and 79%
for girls. Next we calculated the probability of winning conditional on performance for the
mixed groups. For boys solving 5 mazes in Round 2 it is 28% while it is 20% for girls. But
for people solving 6 mazes the probability of winning jumps to 65% for boys and 56% for
girls. Therefore, if students have correct beliefs regarding the probability of winning, girls
in single-sex groups should choose to enter the tournament more than girls in mixed gender
groups, producing evidence in-line with the third conjecture above. But let us compare the
actual choices made by the students to these predicted probabilities to examine the extent
to which beliefs can explain the predicted choices.
When looking at the decision to enter the tournament or not in Round 3, a risk-neutral
student should choose to enter the tournament if her probability of winning, p(win), is
greater than 25%. That is 0:5￿x < 2￿x￿p(win) =) 0:25 < p(win) where x is the number
of mazes solved correctly. Given the probabilities of winning in a mixed gender group,
both girls and boys who correctly solved 5 mazes or less should take the piece-rate option
(assuming that there is some risk aversion for boys) and both boys and girls should chose to
enter the tournament if they solved six or more mazes correctly. However 23% of girls and
51% of boys who solved 5 or less mazes correctly chose to enter the tournament. Therefore
a large percent of students are either risk-loving, have incorrect beliefs, or other factors are
a⁄ecting a student￿ s choice to enter the tournament.
18.For each group type (all girls, all boys, or half each) we randomly drew 10,000 groups comprising that
mix, where we sampled with replacement. The frequency of winning is computed from this. The whole
procedure was repeated 100 times. The average of these win frequencies is reported for each group in the
text. For the win probabilities conditional on number of mazes solved correctly, to be discussed below, the
same procedure was followed.
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We will now focus on the decision a student makes before participating in Round 3 - the
choice of whether or not to compete by entering the tournament. As noted above, having
the subjects compete against predetermined scores, as in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007),
helps to isolate their choice and minimize the chance that strategic games are being played.
A student should choose option two, to enter the tournament, if she thinks she can do better
than everyone else in her group did last time. Her choice should therefore be una⁄ected
by concerns about other students￿choices in the current round; for instance she should not
worry about causing someone else to lose if she chooses the tournament.
We initially examine females alone, in order to focus more clearly on di⁄erences in behav-
iour across girls from di⁄erent educational backgrounds. To address our second conjecture -
that girls from single-sex schools choose to enter the tournament more than girls from coed
schools - we estimated probit models for the subsample of females. The dependent variable
takes the value one if the student chooses option two and zero otherwise. Columns [1] -
[6] of Table 5 present the marginal e⁄ects calculated at the variable averages. Column [1]
shows how much of the decision can be explained by a girl￿ s performance in the Round 2
mandatory tournament and the increase in her performance from the piece-rate to the tour-
nament setting. A girl who solved more mazes correctly in the Round 2 tournament is 6
percentage points more likely to enter the tournament in Round 3.19 How one functioned in
a tournament relative to a piece-rate setting, as represented by the tournament score minus
the piece rate score, is insigni￿cant. Column [2] adds controls for family background and
age.
[Table 5 - Di⁄erences between girls]
Column [3] includes our main variables of interest: attendance at a single-sex school and
whether or not the girl was randomly assigned to an all-girl group. Ceteris paribus, a girl
who attends a single-sex school is 42 percentage points more likely to choose to enter the
tournament than a girl from a coed school. This is after controlling for ability, learning,
family-background, and age. Given that the gender gap in choosing whether or not to
compete was roughly of that magintude in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and Gneezy,
Leonard and List (2008), it would seem that a single-sex educational background has the
potential to change the way women view tournaments.
To look further at the role of nurture, we now address our third conjecture: that girls in
single-sex experimental peer-groups choose to enter the tournament more than girls in coed
19.The marginal e⁄ect was calculated for a girl who had solved 4 mazes correctly in round two ￿the
average number of mazes solved correctly by girls in that round.
14experimental peer-groups. Recall that at the start of the experiment girls were randomly
assigned to single-sex or coed groups. Unlike the schooling type, this ￿ environment￿variable
was controlled by us and allows us to see if the environment a girl has been in for fewer than
20 minutes a⁄ects her decision. As the all-girls group coe¢ cient shows, a girl assigned to
an all-female group is 16 percentage points more likely to choose to enter the tournament,
roughly fourty percent of the di⁄erence that exists between girls at single-sex and coed
schools. This striking result shows that environment matters. Even though the girls had
been in the randomly-assigned experimental group for only 20 minutes, this nonetheless
a⁄ected their choices.
The signi￿cance of these coe¢ cients to single-sex schooling and to all-girls group provides
evidence strongly in support of the second and third conjectures, and suggests that the
environment in which a girl is placed a⁄ects whether or not she chooses to compete. However,
before pushing this interpretation further, we next examine the robustness of the results.
Sensitivity Analysis We begin by dividing the sample into di⁄erent subgroups. The
regression results in columns [4] and [5] of Table 5 compare single-sex girls to di⁄erent control
groups from our sample. In column [4], we report marginal e⁄ects from a speci￿cation
estimated on a subsample comprising only female students from single-sex schools in Essex
and from coed schools in Su⁄olk. Since Su⁄olk does not have selective grammar schools,
students in that county attend the school in whose catchment area they live. In this
regression, the all-girls coe¢ cients and the single-sex coe¢ cient are signi￿cant, although
their magnitudes di⁄er somewhat compared to the estimates in column [3]. In column [4]
we add the 17 female students from Essex who took the 11+ exam but did not attend a
single-sex school. In 2008, of all the students o⁄ered admission to a CSSE school, less than
10% of parents declined admission on behalf of their children.20 Therefore, conditional on
having sat the exam, it is highly likely that the student will attend if she gains admission.
The group of students taking the 11+ exam are a more homogenous subgroup of our sample
and selection is less likely to be an issue conditional on having taken the exam. In column
[5] the size and signi￿cance of the all-girls group coe¢ cients are roughly the same as in
column [4] and the size of the single-sex coe¢ cient in column [5] is still lower than in column
[3]. Since the single-sex coe¢ cient and the all-girls coe¢ cient stay large and signi￿cant the
results in columns [4] and [5] suggest that selection may not be playing a big role. However,
perhaps unobserved heterogeneity partly explains the results, since the coe¢ cient size on
single-sex is di⁄erent in regressions [3], [4], and [5]. To explore this issue further, we next
examine the separate subsample comprising only boys, as shown in Table 6 below. Our aim
20.These numbers were obtained from Shamsun Noor at the local authority council for Essex.
15here is to see if an analogous result is found for boys.
[Table 6 - Di⁄erences amoung boys]
Column [3] of Table 6 shows that there is no statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect of attending
a single-sex school on the probability that a boy enters the tournament in round three.
Likewise, in column [4] - when we restrict the sample to only boys from Su⁄olk and boys
who took the 11+ exam from Essex - there is no signi￿cant e⁄ect. Therefore, if unobserved
heterogeneity were driving the results, that heterogeneity would have to be present only
for girls. If one assumes that the equally prestigious state-funded, single-sex schools are as
bene￿cial for boys and girls, then it would be unlikely for unobserved heterogeneity to explain
the di⁄erences between boys and girls. In fact to do that the selection of girls into single-sex
schools would have to be correlated with girls￿preference for competition but not with boys￿
preference for competition. Given that boys and girls take the same exam for admission
into the CSSE schools this seems highly unlikely. However, if parents of competitive girls
found out that single-sex schooling could bene￿t their daughter and pushed their children
to go to a single-sex school then this could be an explination for our results. In 2009, there
were 536 places available for girls and 542 places available for boys in the six single-sex CSSE
schools. On exam day 3628 students, of which 1861 were girls and 1767 were boys, took
the 11+ exam making the average probability of admission for a girl 29% and 31% for a
boy. Given the similarity in chances of being admitted and the number of boys and girls
who took the exam, it is unlikely that single-sex schools admit more competitive girls but
not more competitive boys.
Next we return to the all-girl subsample and the results in Table 5, in order to check the
robustness of the all-girls group coe¢ cient. When choosing whether or not to compete, a
girl￿ s decision could be in￿ uenced by the composition of her group, as found in Gneezy et al.
(2003). For example, if a female chooses to compete more in an all-girls group, perhaps it
is because she believes she has a better chance of beating a girl￿ s score rather than a boy￿ s
score. If that is the case, the all-girls group dummy may be picking up this e⁄ect. To
examine this, we add an extra control to the column [3] in Table 5 speci￿cation. This is a
dummy variable that equals one if the experimental group has two boys in it. Thus groups
with one boy in them are the base group for the regression. The results are reported in
column [6].21 If girls are choosing to compete more in the all-girls group because there are
no boys present, we would expect the new coe¢ cient on two boys to be negative and the
21.In column [6] we only used groups with no boys, one boy, or two boys because there were only six girls
in groups with three boys. Those six girls all chose not to participate in the lottery and thus the coe¢ cient
cannot be estimated in the probit regression. If an OLS estimation is used then with the All-Girls, two
boys, and three boys dummy variables included, again, only the All-Girls dummy is statistically signi￿cant.
16signi￿cance of the coe¢ cient on the all-girl dummy variable to decrease. Since neither of
these e⁄ects is found there the evidence strongly suggests that the coe¢ cient for the all-girls
group is unlikely to be due simply to group composition.
We now consider an extension to Conjecture 3 that involves an interaction between single-
sex schooling and experimental-group assignment. Since students from single-sex schools are
not used to competing against the other sex, the gender composition of the group could
a⁄ect girls from single-sex schools di⁄erently to girls from coed schools. To investigate this,
we also tried including an interaction between single-sex schooling and experimental-group
assignment. Since this interaction was always statistically insigni￿cant, we have not reported
that in the tables (the full set of estimates is available from the authors on request).
To examine the robustness of our single-sex schooling coe¢ cient, we used two economet-
ric techniques, instrumental variable estimation and propensity score matching. We report
estimates of the linear probability model (LPM) in column [7] of Table 5. The LPM coef-
￿cients on single-sex education and being in an all-girls group are roughly the same as the
marginal e⁄ects in the probit regressions.22 Finally, column [8] in Table 5 reports the results
from an additional test of the robustness of the single-sex ￿nding: the use of an instrument
for single-sex school attendance. Given potential endogeniety, we want an instrument that is
correlated with single-sex schooling but uncorrelated with the probability that a student will
choose to enter the tournament. We utilize instruments based on the student￿ s residential
postcode. Travel-to-school time is a good measure of the cost to a family of attending a par-
ticular school. The further away a student lives, the earlier she has to get up in the morning
and the more parental traveling is involved in ferrying children to extra-curricular activities.
There are far fewer single-sex schools in Essex than there are coed schools, and hence on
average children attending Essex single-sex schools live further away. (Su⁄olk-based children
cannot attend state-funded single-sex schools at all.) Living further away from a school is
likely to be associated with a greater cost of attendance.
With this in mind, we used the six-digit residential postcode for each student to calculate
the distances to the nearest single-sex school and to the nearest coed school. (Our sample
size shrinks slightly, as some postcode responses were unreadable.) From this, we imputed
the minimum traveling time to the closest coeducational school and to the closest single-sex
school.23 We next calculated a variable equal to the minimum time needed to travel to
22.To examine further the role of experimental group to which one was assigned and its composition,
we estimated a LPM speci￿cation with a ￿xed-e⁄ect for each group. It is interesting that the single-sex
coe¢ cient stayed roughly the same, suggesting that group compositional e⁄ects are not a⁄ecting the single-
sex coe¢ cient much. Moreover the ￿xed-e⁄ects are not statistically signi￿cant, either individually or jointly,
suggesting that the experiment was appropriately controlled.
23.To calculate this, we used the postcode of each school and the postcode in which a stu-
dent resides. We then entered the student￿ s postcode in the ￿start￿ category in MapQuest.co.uk
17the closest single-sex school minus the minimum time to travel to the closest coeducational
school. The means of these variables are reported in tables one and two for various groups.
We then break this variable into deciles creating 10 dummy variables. For example, if
the di⁄erence in travelling time for a student fell in the ￿rst decile, that student would be
assigned a one for the ￿rst dummy variable and a zero for all others. Using these 10 variables,
we instrumented for attendance at a single-sex school using a two-step process. First, we
estimated the probability of a student attending a single-sex school, where the explanatory
variables were an Essex dummy (taking the value one if the student resides in Essex and
zero otherwise), an interaction of Essex-resident with the 10 travelling-time variables, and,
because of the single-sex interactions used as controls, the interactions of Essex-resident, the
10 travelling-time variables with our controls. We then estimated the regression reported in
column [8], where we use predicted single-sex school attendance in place of the original single-
sex school dummy. Since the equation uses predicted values, we bootstrapped the standard
errors for attending a single-sex school.24 Again, the coe¢ cient to single-sex schooling is
statistically signi￿cant although now slightly smaller in magnitude.25 In Table 6 we show
the LPM and IV estimates for boys. Again the results only hold for the girls. The ￿rst-stage
regression estimation can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix.
Propensity score matching can also be used to address the fact that single-sex education
is a non-random treatment. To implement the propensity score we use all pre-treatment
information collected on the exit survey: number of siblings; number of female siblings; birth
order; parental education levels; parental employment status; and parental employment
industry (if employed). We then estimate the probability that a student will be treated (ed-
ucated at a single-sex school) and then compare treated individuals to their closest neighbor
in term of the propensity score. After doing this, we ￿nd that that, on average, a girl
attending a single-sex school will enter the tournament 38 percentage points more than her
coed counterparts. To get a standard error for the estimated 0.28, we bootstrapped the
sample 1000 times and found that the point estimate of 0.28 has a standard error of 0.10
making the t-statistic for the estimate 2.8. The propensity score results based on di⁄erent
neighborhood sizes are listed in Table 7.
(http://www.mapquest.co.uk/mq/directions/mapbydirection.do) and the school￿ s postcode in the ￿ending
address.￿Mapquest then gave us a ￿total estimated. time￿for driving from one location to the other. It
is this value that we used. Thus the ￿average time￿is based on the speed limit of roads and the road￿ s
classi￿cation (i.e. as a motorway or route).
24.We randomly drew 1,000 di⁄erent samples from our experimental data to calculate the bootstrap
results.
25.We also experimented with using a di⁄erent instrument - a set of dummy variables for students￿
residential postcode. The results were no di⁄erent to those reported above, so in the interests of brevity we
do not report this in the table. The estimates are available from the authors on request.
18[Table 7 - Propensity Scores]
Given that the signi￿cance of the single-sex coe¢ cient and the all-girls coe¢ cient remains
when comparing students to di⁄erent control groups and when using di⁄erent econometric
techniques designed to deal with the potential endogeneity, we conclude that there exists
strong evidence in support of the second and third conjectures. We will now compare girls
and boys in order to examine our ￿rst and fourth conjectures.
V.C. Di⁄erences between Girls and Boys
The regression results reported in Table 7 are obtained from the sample of boys and girls,
and from di⁄erent subsets of the full sample, as described in the note under the table. Table
5 above provided evidence in support of the second and third conjectures. Table 7 below
will allow us to examine the ￿rst and fourth conjectures.
[Table 7 - Whole Sample]
Our ￿rst conjecture was that males choose to enter the tournament more than females.
Column [1] of Table 7 reports a speci￿cation including only the gender dummy. It shows
that girls choose to enter the tournament less than boys. This result is similar in size and
signi￿cance to the results obtained by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and Gneezy, Leonard
and List (2008), and supports the ￿rst conjecture. Column [2] reports estimates from a
speci￿cation in which we also control for tournament performance, the change from piece-
rate to tournament setting, and the standard controls and their interactions. The inclusion
of these variables does not diminish the size or signi￿cance of the marginal gender e⁄ect. In
column [3] the school and group controls are added to the regression. The absolute value
of the marginal gender e⁄ect again increases. Thus in our preferred speci￿cation - after
controlling for ability, observables, learning, and environment - we ￿nd that girls from coed
schools are 71 percentage points less likely to enter the tournament than boys from coed
schools. This e⁄ect is larger in absolute terms than that found in other work but we are
using school students and not the college-aged students who are the usual subjects. The
results from columns [1]-[3] provide strong support for conjecture one, that men chose to
enter the tournament more than women.
The signi￿cant gender gap only exists for students in coed schools. In column [3] the
coe¢ cient on the interaction of female and single-sex is signi￿cant, whereas the coe¢ cient on
single-sex is not. Thus boys from single-sex and coed schools are statistically just as likely to
enter the tournament. How do single-sex girls compare to boys? To answer this we report
the marginal e⁄ect for a single-sex female at the bottom of column [3]. The estimated
19di⁄erence between a single-sex female and a coed male is negative but it is insigni￿cant.
Therefore, according the results in column [3], single-sex girls are choosing to enter the
tournament just as much as boys from coed and single-sex schools. However, the robustness
of that result needs to be examined.
The lack of signi￿cance on the marginal e⁄ect for girls at a single-sex school shows that
single-sex girls act just like coed boys. The signi￿cance on the interaction of female and
single-sex shows that the bene￿t from single-sex education is going primarily to girls, as
suggested by much of the education literature. These two results provide evidence in favour
of the fourth conjecture.
Sensitivity Analysis As before, we begin by comparing single-sex students to a more
homogeneous subgroup: students from Essex who took the 11+ and students from Su⁄olk.26
The results for this comparison are shown in column [4] of Table 7. The size of the female
and female, single-sex interaction stay roughly the same. However, the signi￿cance of
the interaction between female and single-sex increases. At the bottom of column [4], the
marginal e⁄ect of being a single-sex female is shown. Here the estimate is signi￿cant. What
this shows is that single-sex girls are slightly worse than coed boys but, given the signi￿cance
of the female, single-sex interaction, the gap between boys and girls in coed schools is larger
than the gap between coed boys and single-sex girls. In this situation then we ￿nd that
single-sex girls are still entering the tournament with a higher probability but that they are
not behaving exactly like coed boys. This evidence does not support hypothesis four.
Experimental evidence has shown that women tend to be less risk averse than boys.
Entering the tournament introduces more uncertainty into the payo⁄ that the subject will
receive. Thus, gender di⁄erences in risk aversion may be driving the gender di⁄erences in
tournament entry. To get at this we asked students a series of questions regarding risk in
the exit questionaire. The main question was "On a scale from 1-10 how prepared are you
to take risks" where 1 was labeled ￿ not at all prepared to take risks￿and 10 was labeled
￿ fully prepared to take risks￿ .27 As shown in Tables 1 and 2, on average there were no gender
di⁄erences in response to the question in either the coed or single-sex cohorts. However,
girls from single-sex schools were more likely to take risks than their coed counterparts.
26.Our sample has fewer boys than girls. When we consider the subsample comprising only single-sex
students and students from Essex who took the 11+, we only have 12 boys from a coed school and therefore
cannot estimate the model. For the subsample comprising only students from Su⁄olk and single-sex students,
we only have 20 coed boys and again cannot estimate the model. Therefore, unlike in the girls section, the
smallest sub-group for whom we can estimate the model is single-sex and Su⁄olk students and students who
took the 11+. In this subgroup we have 32 coed boys as our base sample.
27.This general risk question is exactly the same as that asked in the 2004 wave of the German Socioeco-
nomic Panel (GSOEP).
20In columns [5] and [6] of Table 7, each subject￿ s answer to this question was included in
the estimation of the model. In column [6] we allowed the e⁄ect of the student￿ s risk
aversion to vary by gender. In both cases the gender gap, as represented by the female
coe¢ cient, decreased, suggesting that risk aversion can explain part of the gender di⁄erence
in tournament entry, but it was still negative and signi￿cant. The size and signi￿cance of
the interaction between female and single-sex stayed almost exactly the same. Furthermore,
as in column [3], there is no signi￿cant di⁄erence in the probabilty of a single-sex girl and a
coed boy chosing to enter the tournament.
The results in Table 7 present mixed evidence for our fourth conjecture. What can be
taken away from the table, however, is that the bene￿t of single-sex education - in terms of
increasing competitive behaviour - is being realized primarily by females, and that the gap
in tournament entry between single-sex girls and coed boys is smaller than the gap between
boys and girls from coed schools. Therefore, while we cannot conclude that single-sex girls
are behaving like coed boys, there is evidence that the single-sex environment is making girls
more competitive than girls at coed schools.
VI. Conclusions
Our experimental evidence suggests that women seem to be shying away from competi-
tion, as also shown by other studies. However the bulk of our evidence suggests that a girl￿ s
environment plays an important role in explaining why she chooses not to compete. We
have looked at the choices made by girls from single-sex and co-ed schools and found that
there are robust di⁄erences in their behaviour: girls from single-sex schools behave more
competitively than do coeducational girls. We have also examined the e⁄ect of a randomly
assigned environment ￿being assigned to an all-girls group. Being in an all-girls group for
only 20 minutes a⁄ects the decision a girl makes, even when controlling for composition of
the group to which she is randomly assigned for the experiment. We also compared girls￿
behaviour with that of boys from single-sex and coeducational schools, and found that girls
from single-sex schools behaved more like boys. Our ￿ndings are consistent with the gender
identity theory outlined at the start of the paper and with the education literature that
suggest that there is greater pressure for girls to maintain their gender identity in schools
where boys are present than for boys when girls are present (Maccoby, 1990, 1998).
The experimental evidence supports the ￿rst three conjectures: that boys choose to
enter the tournament more than girls; that girls from single-sex schools choose to enter the
tournament more than girls from coed schools; and that girls in single-sex experimental peer-
groups choose to enter the tournament more than girls in coed experimental peer-groups.
21The evidence for the fourth conjecture - that girls from single-sex schools choose to enter
the tournament at the same rate as boys - was rather more mixed. However, our evidence
did suggest that the tournament-entry gap between single-sex girls and coed boys is at least
smaller than the gap between boys and girls from coed schools, if not non-existent.
Are there any other ￿ nature￿arguments that might explain our results rather than the
￿ nurture￿argument we have put forward? The only other hypothesis we can think of that
is consistent with our ￿ndings is that girls who happen to be genetically more competitive
gain admission to single-sex schools, whereas boys who are genetically more competitive do
not. This seems deeply implausible.
In summary, we have discovered at least one setting - in addition to the Kasai tribe of
India studied by Gneezy, Leonard and List (2008) - in which it is untrue that the average
female avoids competitive behaviour more than the average male. On average girls from
single-sex schools are found in our experiment to be as likely as coed boys to choose compet-
itive behaviour. This suggests that the observed gender di⁄erences in competitive choices
found in previous studies might re￿ ect social learning rather than inherent gender traits.
What are the other implications of our study? Our major ￿nding is that an environ-
ment such as single-sex schooling can a⁄ect economically important preferences. However
we would not wish to suggest that concerned parents should at once enrol their daughters
in single-sex schools during those sensitive adolescent years. This is because there might
be other advantages to coeducational secondary education, not least in terms of socializing
boys and girls and preparing them for mixed-gender tertiary colleges and workplaces, that
might outweigh the e⁄ects isolated in our experiment. But our analysis does serve to illus-
trate the importance of the school environment in a⁄ecting real economic outcomes through
behavioural responses.28 For example, the di⁄erences in competitive behaviour that we have
observed across school type could well have e⁄ects on future pay-negotiation and remuner-
ation. Indeed, a testable hypothesis for future survey-based studies is that there are wage
gaps between women of the same ability educated at single-sex and coeducational schools.
Finally our research, and that of related studies before us, point to an important topic -
whether or not for a society there is an optimal level of competitive behaviour. While this
is beyond the reach of experiments like ours, further investigation of this di¢ cult question
could well prove fruitful in the future.
28.If nurture matters, as we have shown, educational curricula could address environmental issues that
would allow students to develop to their full potential without being cued or pressured to follow gender
identity.
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24VII. Appendix A: The Experiment
In the experiment, students were escorted into a large auditorium. One individual read
o⁄ the instructions at the same time to everyone who was participating. All the graduate
supervisors hired to supervise groups were given a copy of the instructions, were involved
in the pilot that had taken place, and had gone through comprehensive training. These
supervisors answered questions if they were raised.
Below are the text of the slides that were shown to the students when they arrived at
the auditorium:
Slide 1:
Welcome to the University of Essex!
Today you are going to be taking part in an economics experiment.
Treat this as if it were an exam situation:
No talking to your neighbours.
Raise your hand if you have any questions.
There will be no deception in this experiment.
Slide 2:
The experiment today will involve completing 3 rounds of mazes.
Rules for completing a maze:
Get from the ￿ ag on the left hand side to the ￿ ag on the right hand side.
Do not cross any lines!
Do not go outside of the box.
We will now go through an example!!
Comment:
At this point students were shown one practice maze and were walked through how to
solve it, illustrating the three points raised above.
Slide 3:
The supervisors in your row will be handing you maze packets throughout the session.
At all times you need to put your seat letter and number on the packet and your name.
Please make sure you know your row letter and seat number.
Your seat is also on your badge. It is the middle grouping. For example, if you badge
was 1-A3-F your seat number should be A3. Make sure this is correct now.
Mazes: You should do the mazes in order.
If you cannot solve a maze put an X through it and go onto the next maze.
If you do not put an X through it none of the following mazes will be marked.
25Note: If you do not have the correct seat number on your maze packets you may be paid
incorrectly.
Slide 4:
We are going to be doing six rounds of mazes.
Before each round of mazes we will explain how you will be paid for that round.
After all six rounds of mazes are ￿nished we will choose one round to "implement".
That means you will get paid for your performance in that round.
The round for which you will be paid will be chosen randomly from this cup.
You will also receive GBP 5 for showing up today.
Since you do not know for which round you will be getting paid, you should do your best
in each round and treat each round separately.
Slide 5:
You will get 5 minutes to solve up to 15 mazes.
Please solve as many mazes as you can.
Do not begin until I say go!
For this round you will get npounds 0.50 for each maze you solve correctly:
Example: If you solve 8 mazes correctly you will earn GBP 4.
Please make sure you have put your name and seat on the maze packet now.
Are there any questions?
OK ￿ > GO!
OK ￿ > STOP
No Talking!
Slide 6:
Now you will get npounds 2 for each maze you solve correctly IF you solve the most
mazes correctly in your group.
Your group consists of you and the 3 other people sitting in your ntextquotedblleft
rowntextquotedblright who have the same ￿rst number on their badge.
Example: If your badge number is 1-B2-M then your group consists of you and the three
other students with the badges 1-**-* in your row.
If you are in group 1 and you solve 8 mazes correctly then:
IF everyone else in your group solved fewer than 8 mazes correctly you will get GBP
16.
IF someone in your group solved 9 mazes correctly, you would get GBP 0.
26Note: Ties will be broken randomly. Thus IF two people in your group solve 8 mazes
correctly we ￿ ip a coin to see who gets the GBP 16.
Are there any questions?
Slide 7:
You will get 5 minutes to solve up to 15 mazes.
Please solve as many mazes as you can
Please make sure you have put your name and seat on the maze packet now.
Do not begin until I say go!
OK ￿ > GO!
OK ￿ > STOP
No Talking!
Slide 8:
In this round you choose between two options.
Option 1: Get GBP 0.50 per maze you solve correctly.
Option 2: Get GBP 2 per maze you solve correctly IF you solve more mazes correctly
than the other three people in your group did LAST round.
Example: Say you solve 8 mazes correctly this round.
If you chose option 1 you get GBP 4.
If you chose option 2:
You get GBP 16 IF the other three people in your group solved fewer than 8
mazes correctly in Round 2.
You get GBP 0 IF one other person solved 9 mazes correctly in Round 2.
Note: Ties will be broken randomly. Thus IF one person in your group solved
8 mazes correctly in round 2 we ￿ ip
a coin to see if you get the GBP 16.
Are there any questions?
Slide 9:
A supervisor will now come by and give you a card for you to circle option 1 or option 2.
Option 1: Get GBP 0.50 per maze you solve correctly.
Option 2: Get GBP 2 per maze you solve correctly IF you solve more mazes correctly
than the other three people in your group did LAST round.
Circle your choice, fold the paper and give it back to the supervisor.
You need to write your seat number on the piece of paper
Do not tell anyone your choice!
27You will get 5 minutes to solve up to 15 mazes.
Please solve as many mazes as you can
Do not begin until I say go!
Please make sure you have put your name and seat on the maze packet now.
Do not begin until I say go!
OK ￿ > GO!
OK ￿ > STOP
No Talking!
Slide 10:
Thank you for completing the mazes!
Your last set of mazes will now be collected ￿please stay seated.
I will now pull the number from the hat..... AND!?
You will be handed a survey ￿Read the questions very carefully and make sure you
respond to ALL the questions including the ones at the very end.
After everyone is done completing the survey a supervisor will hand you some refresh-
ments.
Make sure you put your seat on the survey!
Then after 10-15 minutes, your supervisor will give you an envelope with your money
and ask you to sign a piece of paper. Then you will go to your bus.
Please keep your winnings con￿dential.
THANKS!
Comment:
Due to the time it took to ￿ll all the envelopes with money, subjects ended up recieving
the money two days later as the students needed to get back to their schools to be picked
up by their parents.
28VARIABLES Coed SS Dif Coed SS Dif
Piece‐Rate Score (R1) 2.16 2.62 0.46*** 2.88 3.13 0.25
[0.11] [0.17] [0.17] [0.24]
Tournament Score (R2) 3.78 4.14 0.36 4.71 5.17 0.46
[0.15] [0.24] [0.20] [0.29]
Mean Difference (R2‐R1) 1.63 1.52 ‐0.11 1.83 2.05 0.22
[0.15] [0.24] [0.18] [0.26]
Number of Siblings 1.67 1.59 ‐0.08 1.69 1.28 ‐0.41*
[0.11] [0.17] [0.15] [0.22]
Number of Female Siblings 0.80 0.57 ‐0.23* 0.87 0.68 ‐0.19
[0.08] [0.12] [0.13] [0.19]
Birth Order 1.73 1.78 0.05 1.86 1.46 ‐0.40**
[0.09] [0.15] [0.12] [0.17]
Age 14.80 14.95 0.15 14.81 14.48 ‐0.33**
[0.06] [0.10] [0.09] [0.13]
Transferred to 0.24 0.17 ‐0.07 0.21 0.22 0.01
[0.04] [0.07] [0.06] [0.08]
Mother went to University 0.12 0.48 0.36*** 0.15 0.43 0.28***
[0.04] [0.07] [0.06] [0.09]
Father went to University 0.16 0.52 0.36*** 0.27 0.54 0.27***
[0.04] [0.07] [0.07] [0.10]
Min travel nearest coed school 13.45 24.23 10.78*** 14.59 27.63 13.04***
[1.04] [1.64] [1.48] [2.21]
Min travel nearest single‐sex school 24.18 15.32 ‐8.86*** 24.53 12.95 ‐11.58***
[0.80] [1.24] [1.29] [1.91]
Average risk score ( Scale =  1‐10) 6.40 6.95 0.55* 6.90 6.69 ‐0.21
[0.18] [0.29] [0.93] [1.38]
OBSERVATIONS 96 66 52 46
GIRLS BOYS
Table 1: Sample proportions and averages by gender and school‐backgroundVARIABLES Girls Boys Dif Girls Boys Dif
Piece‐Rate Score (R1) 2.62 3.13 ‐0.51** 2.15 2.88 ‐0.73***
[0.22] [0.17] [0.19] [0.15]
Tournament Score (R2) 4.13 5.17 ‐1.04*** 3.78 4.71 ‐0.93***
[0.28] [0.21] [0.26] [0.21]
Mean Difference (R2‐R1) 1.51 2.04 ‐0.53* 1.63 1.83 ‐0.20
[0.27] [0.21] [0.24] [0.19]
Number of Siblings 1.59 1.28 0.31 1.66 1.69 ‐0.03
[0.19] [0.15] [0.19] [0.16]
Number of Female Siblings 0.57 0.67 ‐0.10 0.81 0.87 ‐0.06
[0.15] [0.11] [0.15] [0.12]
Birth Order 1.78 1.47 0.31* 1.72 1.86 ‐0.14
[0.16] [0.12] [0.17] [0.13]
Age 14.95 14.48 0.47*** 14.8 14.81 ‐0.01
[0.12] [0.09] [0.11] [0.09]
Transferred to 0.17 0.22 ‐0.05 0.24 0.21 0.03
[0.08] [0.06] [0.07] [0.06]
Mother went to University 0.48 0.43 0.05 0.12 0.15 ‐0.03
[0.10] [0.07] [0.06] [0.05]
Father went to University 0.51 0.54 ‐0.03 0.16 0.27 ‐0.11*
[0.10] [0.07] [0.07] [0.05]
Min travel nearest coed school 24.23 27.63 ‐3.40* 13.45 14.59 ‐1.14
[2.02] [1.55] [1.64] [1.32]
Min travel nearest single‐sex school 15.32 12.95 2.37 24.18 24.53 ‐0.35
[1.69] [1.30] [1.06] [0.85]
Average risk score ( Scale =  1‐10) 6.95 6.69 0.26 6.4 6.90 ‐0.50
[0.38] [0.29] [0.30] [0.24]
OBSERVATIONS 66 46 96 52
Table 2: Sample proportions and averages by gender within school‐setting
SINGLE‐SEX COEDVARIABLES All‐Girls Coed Dif All‐Boys Coed Dif
Table 3: Sample proportions and averages by group‐type
Girls Boys
VARIABLES All Girls Coed Dif All Boys Coed Dif
Piece‐Rate Score (R1) 2.32 2.38 ‐0.06 3.16 2.90 0.26
[0.17] [0.12] [0.25] [0.15]
Tournament Score (R2) 3.93 3.92 0.01 4.97 4.90 0.07
[0.24] [0.18] [0.31] [0.19]
Mean Difference (R2‐R1) 1.61 1.54 0.07 1.81 2.00 ‐0.19
[0.23] [0.17] [0.27] [0.16]
Number of Siblings 1.73 1.53 0.20 1.75 1.35 0.40*
[0.16] [0.12] [0.23] [0.14]
Number of Female Siblings 0.71 0.70 0.01 0.77 0.77 0.00
[0.12] [0.09] [0.19] [0.12]
Birth Order 1.83 1.64 0.19 1.66 1.68 ‐0.02
[0.15] [0.11] [0.18] [0.11]
Age 14 98 14 73 02 5 *** 14 56 14 71 01 5 Age 14.98 14.73 0.25*** 14.56 14.71 ‐0.15
[0.09] [0.07] [0.13] [0.08]
Transferred to 0.21 0.20 0.01 0.28 0.18 0.10
[0.06] [0.05] [0.09] [0.05]
Percent from Single‐Sex School 0.4 0.42 ‐0.02 0.53 0.44 0.09
[0.08] [0.06] [0.11] [0.06]
Mother went to University 0.26 0.28 ‐0.02 0.2 0.34 ‐0.14 y
[0.07] [0.05] [0.09] [0.06]
Father went to University 0.31 0.28 0.03 0.34 0.44 ‐0.10
[0.07] [0.05] [0.10] [0.06]
Min travel nearest coed school 17.12 18.49 ‐1.37 18.91 21.44 ‐2.53
[1.83] [1.36] [2.43] [1.44]
Min travel nearest single‐sex school 19.87 21.35 ‐1.48 20.68 18.57 2.11
[1 42] [1 06] [1 91] [1 12] [1.42] [1.06] [1.91] [1.12]
Average risk score ( Scale =  1‐10) 6.54 6.73 ‐0.19 6.71 6.85 ‐0.14
[0.29] [0.21] [0.41] [0.25]
OBSERVATIONS 88 74 36 62VARIABLE [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Female (=1) ‐0.65*** ‐0.89*** ‐0.91** ‐0.60*** ‐0.50 ‐0.42
[0.14] [0.31] [0.39] [0.18] [0.36] [0.47]










Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Controls * Female No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Controls * Single‐Sex No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Controls * Female *Single‐Sex No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Constant 3.00*** 3.27*** 2.94*** 3.10*** 2.92*** 2.66***
[0.11] [0.25] [0.32] [0.26] [0.41] [0.45]
Observations 260 259 259 260 259 259








[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Tournament Score in Round 2 0.06* 0.09** 0.06 0.09* 0.08* 0.06 0.05* 0.07**
[0.03] [0.04] [0.03] [0.05] [0.04] [0.04] [0.03] [0.03]
Tournament ‐ Piece Rate Score 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01
[0.03] [0.04] [0.04] [0.05] [0.04] [0.04] [0.03] [0.03]
Single‐Sex (=1) 0.42*** 0.28** 0.34** 0.46*** 0.40*** 0.38**
[0.14] [0.14] [0.14] [0.14] [0.14] [0.17]
All‐Girls Group (=1) 0.16** 0.28*** 0.24*** 0.18** 0.17** 0.16**
[0.07] [0.09] [0.08] [0.09] [0.07] [0.07]
Two Boys in Experimental Group (=1) 0.05
[0.13]
Model Type Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit LPM IV
Controls NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Controls * Single‐Sex NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant ‐0.22** ‐0.27**
[0.11] [0.11]











[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Tournament Score in Round 2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.06
[0.04] [0.05] [0.05] [0.06] [0.04] [0.04]
Tournament ‐ Piece Rate Score ‐0.04 ‐0.03 ‐0.04 ‐0.11 ‐0.03 ‐0.02
[0.05] [0.06] [0.06] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06]
Single‐Sex (=1) 0.09 ‐0.03 0.10 0.09
[0.24] [0.27] [0.20] [0.25]
All‐Boys Group (=1) ‐0.13 ‐0.09 ‐0.10 ‐0.08
[0.12] [0.14] [0.11] [0.13]
Model Type Probit Probit Probit Probit LPM IV
Controls NO YES YES YES YES YES
Controls * Single‐Sex NO YES YES YES YES YES
Constant 0.39* 0.36
[0.20] [0.22]









university (=1); Number of siblings; Number of female siblings; Student age 14 (=1).Single‐Sex 0.28*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.28** 0.28*** 0.25*** 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.27***
[0.10] [0.10] [0.12] [0.11] [0.10] [0.09] [0.10] [0.09] [0.09] [0.10]
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149




[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Female (=1) ‐0.27*** ‐0.39*** ‐0.71*** ‐0.78*** ‐0.67*** ‐0.60**
[0.06] [0.13] [0.12] [0.13] [0.13] [0.28]
Tournament Score 0.09*** 0.07** 0.11*** 0.06** 0.06**
[0.03] [0.03] [0.04] [0.03] [0.03]
Tournament ‐ Piece Rate Score ‐0.01 0.00 ‐0.02 0.02 0.02
[0.03] [0.03] [0.04] [0.03] [0.03]
Single‐Sex (=1) 0.04 ‐0.07 0.05 0.05
[0.21] [0.25] [0.21] [0.21]
Female * Single‐Sex 0.49* 0.56** 0.50* 0.50*
[0.26] [0.27] [0.26] [0.26]
All‐Girls Group (=1) 0.22** 0.33*** 0.25*** 0.25**
[0.09] [0.11] [0.10] [0.10]
All‐Boys Group (=1) ‐0.10 ‐0.06 ‐0.07 ‐0.07





‐0.284 ‐0.419 ‐0.216 ‐0.107
[0.179] [0.234] [0.156] [0.078]
Model Type Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Controls NO YES YES YES YES YES
Controls * Female NO YES YES YES YES YES
Controls * Single‐Sex NO YES YES YES YES YES
Controls * Female * Single‐Sex NO YES YES YES YES YES
Constant
Observations 260 259 259 200 254 254
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
























































Table A1: First stage regressions for IV estimates in Tables 5 and 5A.  Dependent variable (=1) if student 




















































[0.20] [0.17]Essex * Travel time in sixth decile  * Student Aged 14 (=1) 0.00 ‐0.21
[0.22] [0.56]
Essex * Travel time in seventh decile  * Student Aged 14 (=1) 1.95*** 0.76*
[0.52] [0.42]
Essex * Travel time in eighth decile  * Student Aged 14 (=1) 0.01 0.00
[0.46] [0.00]
Essex * Travel time in nineth decile  * Student Aged 14 (=1) ‐1.37*** 0.00
[0.38] [0.00]
Essex * Travel time in tenth decile  * Student Aged 14 (=1) 0.14 0.00
[0.27] [0.00]
Tournament Score 0.04* 0.05*
[0.03] [0.03]
Tournament Score ‐ Piece Rate Score ‐0.04 ‐0.04
[0.03] [0.03]
Mother went to University (=1) 0.04 0.09
[0.13] [0.09]
Father went to University (=1) 0.06 0.10
[0.12] [0.08]
Number of Brothers 0.00 ‐0.05
[0.04] [0.05]
Number of Sisters ‐0.00 ‐0.01
[0.05] [0.05]
Student aged 14 (=1) ‐0.08 0.17*
[0.08] [0.09]
All‐Girls Group (=1) ‐0.06
[0.05]
All‐Boys Group (=1) 0.06
[0.07]
Constant ‐0.00 ‐0.22
[0.10] [0.16]
Observations 149 93
R‐squared 0.845 0.923
Column [1] uses just girls; Column [2] uses just boys.  Standard Errors are in brackets.  ***p<0.01; ** p<0.05, * p<0.1